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Trading the Privacy Right: Justice Alito’s
Dangerous Reasoning on Privacy Rights
Peter A. Meyers1 & Joshua Osborne-Klein2
The primary role of the judiciary is to protect rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.3 This role becomes especially important when such rights
conflict with majoritarian whim.4 The United States Supreme Court is the
ultimate authority on interpreting the Bill of Rights and is therefore the
body responsible for ensuring that individual rights are protected.5
Accordingly, changes in the composition of the Court can have
consequences on how our society protects individual rights. This concern
crystallized on October 31, 2005, when Samuel A. Alito, Jr., was nominated
by President George W. Bush as an associate justice on the Supreme Court.6
Alito was confirmed by the United States Senate on January 31, 2006, thus
becoming the 110th Supreme Court justice.7 Alito replaced retiring Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, who was often the critical “swing vote” on the
Court.8
During his confirmation hearing, Alito expressly recognized the role of
the judiciary as protector of individual rights. He explained as follows:
there’s a reason why they gave federal judges life tenure, and that
is so . . . they will not decide cases based on the way the wind is
blowing at a particular time . . . when people may lose sight of
fundamental rights, the judiciary stands up for fundamental rights;
that it is not reluctant to stand up for the unpopular and for what
the court termed insular minorities; that the judiciary . . . enforces
the Constitution and laws in a steadfast way . . . .9
However, as it stands now, Justice Alito “has never taken a position more
receptive to individual privacy or security than the position taken by his
colleagues on the same panel.”10 Indeed, despite his rhetoric during his
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confirmation hearing, Justice Alito’s opinions as a judge for the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals11 illustrate a willingness to dilute individual rights.
Moreover, these opinions serve as indicators of how he will likely analyze
individual rights cases as a Supreme Court justice.12
As a justice, Alito will have ample opportunity to further shape the right
to privacy. He will likely rule on privacy cases with issues concerning
abortion,13 gay marriage,14 torture,15 and warrantless electronic
eavesdropping,16 among others. The constitutional jurisprudence in these
cases will invariably require Justice Alito and the other members of the
Court to balance the individual interest in privacy against the broader
governmental interests of efficient law enforcement and preservation of the
health and safety of the people.
Alito’s career, however, has almost always focused on advocating in
favor of broad governmental interests that often contravene interests in
personal privacy. Before becoming a judge, Alito represented the federal
government as assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States and in
the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel.17 Just before being
elevated to the federal bench, Justice Alito was the U.S. Attorney for New
Jersey, where he was best known for prosecuting white-collar,
environmental, drug trafficking, and organized crime.18 As a government
lawyer, Alito has not argued for more liberal privacy rights.19 This kind of
career focus has informed his reasoning as a circuit court judge and will
continue to inform his reasoning as a Supreme Court justice.
In this article, we attempt to determine how Justice Alito will influence
the Supreme Court’s role as protector of individual rights by looking at his
decisions regarding privacy rights when he was a circuit court judge. In
Part I of this article, we explore Justice Alito’s treatment of the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In
Part II, we analyze cases in which Alito has considered the Fifth
Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination and the right to
counsel. In Part III, we have the opportunity to discuss a Sixth Amendment
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case in which Justice Alito, as a member of the Court, wrote the dissent. In
Part IV of this article we discuss cases in which Justice Alito has
commented on the broader right to privacy as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut. In Part V, we conclude that our
examination of Alito’s jurisprudence on the Third Circuit reveals Justice
Alito’s willingness to sacrifice individual rights in order to achieve broad
societal goals. Thus, we predict that he will weaken the Supreme Court’s
ability to protect individual rights, thereby ameliorating the Supreme
Court’s role as the protector of the interests of individuals. With Justice
Alito now on the bench, there will be no relief for individuals seeking to
protect their privacy interests.

I.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment is one of the most important components of the
right to privacy. It provides to people the right “to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures,” and requires warrants to be based “upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”20 The rights afforded by
the Fourth Amendment are unquestionably fundamental; however, these
rights often conflict with the governmental interest in efficient law
enforcement. Unfortunately, because of the ambiguous wording of the
Fourth Amendment, judges have considerable discretion in determining
what police conduct is “unreasonable” and when a warrant affidavit is
sufficiently “particularized.” Justice Alito will take advantage of these
ambiguities to weaken the individual rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment and promote the majoritarian interest in efficient law
enforcement.
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A. Justice Alito Will Weaken the Fourth Amendment by Broadly
Interpreting the Scope of Search Warrants So As To Justify Questionable
Law Enforcement Practices.
Interpretation of the scope and adequacy of search warrants is a topic in
which the malleable Fourth Amendment standard is subject to exploitation.
Justice Alito has strained logic to interpret search warrants in ways that
justify questionable searches. For example, in United States v. Stiver, Alito
considered whether the police could answer a telephone in a private
residence while they were conducting a search of the residence pursuant to a
warrant.21 The search warrant in Stiver authorized the police to search for
and seize “all drug paraphernalia.”22 Alito concluded that the “search” of
incoming telephone calls was authorized under this provision of the warrant
because the telephone constituted “paraphernalia.” Alito reasoned as
follows:
In ordinary usage, the term “paraphernalia” is defined to mean
“equipment [and] apparatus . . . used in or necessary for a
particular activity” . . . . In light of the fact that the officers had
ample cause to believe that the defendant had been using the
apartment to make heroin sales, including sales to individuals who
wanted the drug for personal use, the officers had an entirely
reasonable basis for concluding that the defendant’s telephone was
a piece of “equipment” or “apparatus” that was “used in or
necessary for [the defendant’s] particular activity,” namely selling
drugs to users and others from his residence.23
At a minimum, it is hypertechnical to define the term “paraphernalia” to
include a telephone used to make drug deals. Even the federal government,
which has a critical interest in efficient law enforcement, admits that the
ordinary usage of the term “drug paraphernalia” is more limited.24 The
Stiver decision illustrates Justice Alito’s willingness to contort the plain
language of a warrant so that it satisfies the Fourth Amendment requirement
of “particularity.”25
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Justice Alito’s dissent in Baker v. Monroe Township26 exemplifies an
even more dubious interpretation of a search warrant in favor of law
enforcement interests. Specifically, Alito strained logic to justify a search
that had all the markings of excessiveness. In Baker, a father and mother,
accompanied by their two minor children, were on their way to their adult
child’s apartment for dinner.27 As the Bakers approached the apartment,
several officers began a drug raid on the same apartment, ordered the family
to “get down,” held the family at gun point, left the family handcuffed for
twenty-five minutes, and searched both Mrs. Baker and her minor son.28
The drug raid was authorized by a form warrant that “contained only an
identification of the premises to be searched and mentioned nothing about
any persons” because “no one ever bothered to complete [the warrant] to
include specified persons as well as premises.”29 In dissent, Alito attempted
to interpret the flawed warrant so as to justify the search of the family
members:
[The search warrant] commanded Armstrong and other defendants
“to search the (x) premises described below (x) person(s) described
below (x) vehicle described below. . . . [A]n apartment located in
an apartment building at 607 South Main Street . . . .” To my mind,
by far the best interpretation of these provisions of the warrant is
that they authorized a search of, not only the premises of the
apartment, but also any persons found on the premises. . . . Since
paragraph 4 is supposed to describe “premises,” “persons,” and
“vehicles,” but expressly refers only to the premises of the
apartment, the most reasonable interpretation is that the warrant
authorized a search of the premises and any persons or vehicles
found on the premises.30
The majority in Baker, authored by Senior Circuit Judge Gibson, directly
criticized Alito’s reasoning:
The dissent engages in a lengthy interpretation of the warrant to
find authorization for a search of persons found on the premises….
This elaborate interpretation and analysis and the length to which
the dissent goes in developing it simply point up the inadequacy of
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the warrant to describe any person generally or specifically.
Having said as much, we need not speculate further as to whether
the dissent’s interpretation would cover not only persons found on
the premises, but those outside the premises and on the sidewalk
and steps leading into it. It is also evidence that the dissent makes
its interpretation and bases its analysis on the facts taken in the
light most favorable to the party moving for summary judgment
rather than the non-movant, contrary to the constraints we have
referred to that guide us in reviewing an order granting summary
judgment.31
Alito’s dissent in Baker and the majority opinion in Stiver are examples of
his willingness to reach beyond common sense in interpreting a search
warrant to justify an expansion of law enforcement power at the expense of
individual liberty.
Further limiting the individual’s right to privacy in favor of law
enforcement interests, Alito has argued for limiting the role of the
magistrate in the search warrant process. For example, in United States v.
Hodge, police arrested Hodge on the street after he discarded two bags of
crack cocaine while fleeing from the police.32 Subsequent to the arrest, the
police sought a warrant to search Hodge’s home.33 In the affidavit, an
officer averred that “the quantity of cocaine involved in [Hodge’s]
attempted transaction and the circumstances surrounding his arrest indicated
that Hodge was possessing the crack cocaine with an intent to distribute
it.”34 The officer claimed that “[b]ased upon [his] training and experience,”
he knew that “persons involved in the receipt and distribution of controlled
substances commonly keep within their residences evidence of their
criminal activity.”35 In considering whether this affidavit was sufficient to
support probable cause, Alito admitted that there was “no direct evidence
that drugs or drug paraphernalia would be located in Hodge’s home.”36
Nevertheless, Alito stretched the understanding of probable cause to uphold
the validity of the warrant based on deference to police expertise of drugdealer activities:
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Initially, the facts surrounding Hodge’s arrest suggest that he was
an experienced drug dealer who was operating a drug business. . . .
All these facts combine to suggest that Hodge was an experienced
and repeat drug dealer who would need to store evidence of his
illicit activities somewhere. . . . It is reasonable to infer that a
person involved in drug dealing on such a scale would store
evidence of that dealing at his home.37
This reliance on law enforcement “expertise” to establish probable cause
in the absence of direct evidence gives substantial power to law
enforcement agents to obtain warrants without the normal judicial oversight
required by the Fourth Amendment.
Alito applied the same dangerous reasoning in his dissent in United
States v. Zimmerman.38 In Zimmerman, the police searched the defendant’s
house pursuant to a warrant and found several images of child
pornography.39 The majority held that the warrant was not supported by
probable cause because the warrant application “did not contain any
information indicating that Zimmerman ever possessed child pornography.”
Furthermore, the only evidence that the defendant possessed adult
pornography was one clip of adult pornography allegedly obtained several
months before the search, and thus was stale.40
Alito dissented, arguing the affidavit supporting the search warrant
established probable cause. The affidavit stated that the officer “had been
informed by a postal inspector with lengthy experience investigating crimes
involving the sexual victimization of minors that persons with a sexual
interest in children often collect and keep sexually related images of minors
for lengthy periods and often use pornography depicting adults to assist in
victimizing minors.”41 Thus, Alito argued that probable cause was
established by evidence of “incidents alleged in the affidavit show[ing] that
the defendant had a sexual interest in minors and that he had used sexual
materials . . . as part of his course of conduct.”42 Accordingly, as in the
Hodge majority, Alito’s dissent in Zimmerman relied on generalized notions
of criminal conduct as explained by law enforcement agents—not
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particularized suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment—to argue
that a search warrant was supported by probable cause. Such reasoning is
contrary to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, to which Alito has paid only
lip service.43
B. Alito Will Likely Expand the Circumstances In Which Warrantless
Searches and Seizures Are Permitted Under the Fourth Amendment.
In addition to broadly construing the scope of search warrants, Alito has
broadened the circumstances in which warrantless searches and seizures are
allowed. For example, in United States v. Kithcart, Justice Alito considered
whether police were justified in stopping an automobile and then arresting
and searching the occupants without a warrant.44 In Kithcart, an officer
received three reports of an armed robbery within an hour.45 The reports
described the alleged perpetrators as “two black males in a black sports car
…possible Camaro.”46 Approximately ten minutes after receiving the final
report, near the sites of the robberies, the officer stopped a black Nissan that
appeared to contain a single African-American male.47 After stopping the
car, the officer observed Kithcart, a second African-American male
occupant.48 When Kithcart challenged the stop, the district court ruled that
the police had probable cause based on the direction, timing, location, and
description of the vehicle.49 The district court noted the discrepancy in the
number of occupants in the vehicle but reasoned that because the officer had
not seen any other African-American men driving cars since the robbery,
the stop was reasonable.50
To his credit, Justice Alito disagreed with the district court’s holding that
the stop was based on probable cause. Alito held that
the mere fact that Kithcart is black and that the perpetrators had
been described as two black males is plainly insufficient. . . .
[A]rmed with information that two black males driving a black
sports car were believed to have committed three robberies in the
area some relatively short time earlier, [the officer] could not
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justifiably arrest any African-American man who happened to
drive by in any type of black sports car.51
However, despite rejecting the use of racial profiling as a way to establish
probable cause, Alito remanded for a determination of whether the officer
“had a reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant an investigative stop”
under Terry v. Ohio.52 This holding sparked dissent by Judge McKee, who
would have ruled as a matter of law that the officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop the vehicle “solely because it was a black sports car driven
by an African American male near Bristol Township shortly after she
learned that two African American males had committed a series of armed
robberies in that area.”53 This contrast of opinion illustrates, at a minimum,
Justice Alito’s willingness to accept “racial profiling” as a reasonable basis
for a Terry stop. Such an interpretation of reasonableness is a threat to
protection of minority rights.
Similarly, in Mellot v. Heemer,54 Justice Alito stretched logic to affirm
that a seizure conducted by police was reasonable even though it amounted
to a gross violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Mellott, one of the
plaintiffs asserted that he had been seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment when police used him as a “human shield” by making him
walk into a residence in a “potentially dangerous situation” with a gun
pressed to the plaintiff’s back.55 This case was an appeal of summary
judgment for defendants, so the court should have viewed the facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.56 Despite the deferential standard,
Alito affirmed the summary judgment for defendants “because the evidence
in the summary judgment record cannot support a finding that the plaintiff
Jackie Wright was seized or that a reasonable officer could not have
believed that Wright was not seized.”57 In reaching this conclusion, Alito
noted the following:
There is no evidence that the marshals told [the plaintiff] that he
was not free to leave. Moreover, Wright did not state during the
deposition that he ever told the marshals that he wished to leave or
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to remain outside Kirk’s house. Nor did he testify that the
marshals ever told him that he was not free to leave or to stay
outside the house.58
Thus, disregarding the fact that, according to the complaint, the plaintiff
was forced to enter into a potentially dangerous situation with a gun placed
to his back, Alito held that “the summary judgment record is insufficient to
convince a reasonable fact finder that a reasonable person in Wright’s
position would have felt that he was not free to leave the scene or to stay
outside the house.”59 Commenting on the evidence that the plaintiff was
forced into the house at gunpoint, Alito stated that because the plaintiff was
“in the lead and with the marshals following close behind with their guns
drawn, it would not be surprising for Wright to feel a gun touch his back.”60
This conclusion not only disregards the deferential standard appropriate
when reviewing appeals of summary judgments, it also simply departs from
rationality. It is highly questionable that any individual would “feel free to
leave” when he is being held at gunpoint by police. Indeed, such police
conduct would seem to constitute a quintessential seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.
C. Justice Alito Has Broadly Interpreted Exceptions to the Warrant
Requirement and Limited Remedies for Fourth Amendment Violations.
Justice Alito has attacked the Fourth Amendment from both ends. While
broadly interpreting what constitutes a “reasonable” search and seizure in
cases such as Mellott, discussed above, Alito has simultaneously expanded
the exceptions to the warrant requirement and limited remedies available for
Fourth Amendment violations. For example, in Bolden v. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,61 one of Justice Alito’s early
opinions for the Third Circuit, he broadened the circumstances in which a
third party may consent to a warrantless search. In Bolden, the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority appealed an award of
compensatory damages to Russell Bolden based on an unconstitutional drug
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test that resulted in Bolden’s discharge from employment.62 Alito noted
that “compulsory, suspicionless drug testing of a person holding Bolden’s
job” would violate the Fourth Amendment.63 However, adopting a novel
concept of the consent exception, Alito found that Bolden had impliedly
consented to the drug testing by his membership in the union. Alito held
that
there are a variety of circumstances in which a third party may
validly consent to a search or seizure . . . . [W]e believe that a
union such as Bolden’s may validly consent to terms and
conditions of employment, such as submission to drug testing, that
implicate employees’ Fourth Amendment rights.64
Thus, Alito articulated a new rule for consent in the Third Circuit: “[I]f
the union agrees, or if binding arbitration establishes, that the collective
bargaining agreement impliedly authorizes drug testing, individual
employees are bound by this interpretation unless they can show a breach of
the duty of fair representation.”65 In so holding, Alito noted that “no court
has held that the right to be free from drug testing is one that cannot be
negotiated away . . . .”66
Alito’s decision in Bolden implying that a union member could trade
away a right, was not without controversy. In dissent, Judge Nygaard
criticized Alito’s majority, arguing that the reasoning “confuses the
distinction between a reasonable and an unreasonable search or seizure.”67
Nygaard would have held that Bolden could not “have delegated complete
authority to compromise a right that is the very touch-stone of the Bill of
Rights and consecrated by generations of constitutional jurisprudence.”68 In
criticizing the majority, Nygaard hits close to home by identifying a
recurring theme in Alito’s reasoning:
The majority seems to believe that the scope and nature of Fourth
Amendment rights would depend on the legal framework of labor
law . . . . I reject that importation into Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The contours of the Fourth Amendment cannot be
molded by a union to its utilitarian concept of fairness.69
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Further hammering on this point, Nygaard explained the following:
Fourth Amendment rights are guaranteed to individuals. Unions
do not have inherent actual authority to waive such constitutional
rights; else individual rights would be sacrificed for some
perceived collective good as unions negotiate to get economically
related benefits for their members as a whole. The Bill of Rights is
predicated on the notion that minority or individual rights must be
protected from assault by the majority.”70
Thus, as alluded to by Judge Nygaard in this articulate dissent, Alito’s
decision in Bolden offered early warning that Alito may not be committed
to protection of individual rights, especially in the realm of Fourth
Amendment privacy.
Alito also broadened the consent exception’s application in the context of
electronic eavesdropping. For example, in United States v. Lee, a defendant
argued that a videotape showing the defendant illegally receiving money
from a confidential police informant should have been suppressed under the
Fourth Amendment.71 The videotape was obtained by FBI agents who
electronically monitored and recorded activities in the defendant’s hotel
room using equipment installed in the room by the FBI.72 The agents did
not have a warrant for the surveillance; rather, they relied on consent of the
confidential informant.73 Thus, the agents were instructed to use the
monitoring equipment only when the informant was in the defendant’s
room.74 Alito held that the video surveillance did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, despite the absence of a warrant, because “[t]here was no
evidence that conversations were monitored when [the informant] was
absent [and] . . . the tapes do not depict anything material that [the
informant] himself was not in a position to hear or see while in the room.”75
The dissent in Lee rejected this reasoning, relying largely on Supreme
Court indications in Katz v. United States76 that “self-imposed restraint” by
law enforcement agents “could not legitimize the warrantless seizure of
Katz’s conversations in the public telephone booth.”77 Indeed, it appears
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that the Katz opinion expressly rejects the argument upon which Alito relied
in the Lee majority opinion. In Katz, the Supreme Court noted the
following:
It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet
the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents
themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required,
before commencing the search, to present their estimate of
probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They
were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to
observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court
order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been
completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that
had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has
never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers
reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means
consistent with that end.78
Accordingly, the dissent in Lee argued that Alito erred because, while the
Fourth Amendment does not protect information voluntarily confided to an
informant, in things outside an informant’s perception there remains a
reasonable expectation of privacy.79 Thus, noting that the surveillance
equipment continued to transmit images when the informant was not in the
room and the equipment had a different line of sight than that of the
informant, the dissent would have held that the FBI agents’ self-restraint
was an insufficient safeguard under Katz and, therefore, the videotape
should have been suppressed. Noting Alito’s departure from the Katz
decision, Judge McKee characterized Alito’s Lee opinion as “gulp[ing]
down the Fourth Amendment . . . .”80
Justice Alito will find partnership on the Supreme Court in his quest to
disparage the Fourth Amendment. In Hudson v. Michigan, the Court, with
newly minted Justice Alito on it, faced the question of whether the
exclusionary remedy is triggered by a violation of the “knock-andannounce” rule, which requires officers to knock-and-announce their
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presence and wait a reasonable time before forcibly entering a private
residence.81 The Hudson majority ruled that the exclusionary remedy is not
an available remedy for such a violation.82
In reaching this conclusion, the majority largely ignored the individual
interests that the knock-and-announce rule was designed to protect. Justice
Scalia, writing for a majority composed of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito, recited three historical purposes for
the knock-and-announce rule: (1) protection of human life and limb, (2)
protection of property, and (3) protection of individual privacy by giving a
resident “the opportunity to collect oneself before answering the door.”83
Despite recognizing these interests, the Court found that other remedies—
such as civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, internal discipline of law
enforcement officers, and citizen review—served as sufficient deterrence
for knock-and-announce violations.84
Considering these available
deterrents, the majority reasoned that application of the exclusionary rule to
knock-and-announce violations was unjustified because the “substantial
social costs” that affect “truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives”
outweighed any benefit to the individual rights served by the rule.85
This deemphasis of individual liberty did not go unnoticed by Justice
Breyer, who, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, wrote a
vigorous dissent. Noting inconsistency with prior application of the
exclusionary rule, Justice Breyer argued that the majority opinion
“represents a significant departure from the Court’s precedents” and
“weakens, perhaps destroys, much of the practical value of the
Constitution’s knock-and-announce protection.”86 Justice Breyer relied on
Mapp v. Ohio,87 in which the Court reversed its prior decision in Wolf v.
Colorado88 and held that the exclusionary rule was applicable to the states
because the other remedies the states had devised to address Fourth
Amendment violations had proved “worthless and futile.”89 In Justice
Breyer’s opinion, the majority’s analysis was flawed because it had offered
no proof that these same types of remedies are any less futile today than
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they were when Mapp was decided.90 Justice Breyer charged the majority
with arguing that “Wolf, not Mapp, is now the law.”91
Justice Breyer also discussed the majority’s willingness to sacrifice
individual liberties to promote efficient law enforcement. While conceding
that there are social costs associated with the exclusion of evidence, Justice
Breyer aptly pointed out that these same social costs “accompany any use of
the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary principle . . . .”92 Thus, Justice
Breyer accused the majority of bringing an assault “against the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary principle itself.”93 This condemnation of the
majority’s opinion is consistent with critiques of Justice Alito’s Third
Circuit jurisprudence.94 Accordingly, Hudson serves as an indication that
Justice Alito will continue in his quest of emphasizing law enforcement
concerns to the detriment of individual liberty.
In addition to marginalizing the individual interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment by broadening the exceptions to the warrant
requirement, Alito has expanded the qualified immunity doctrine, which
limits remedies available for Fourth Amendment violations. Qualified
immunity bars lawsuits against individual police officers for violations of
the Fourth Amendment so long as “‘reasonable officials in the defendants’
position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of what was in the
decided case law, that their conduct would be lawful.’”95 In Leveto v.
Lapina, the Third Circuit considered a section 1983 claim96 arising out of a
Terry-style frisk97 of the wife of a doctor targeted by the IRS for
investigation.98 The wife was frisked in her home while she was “wearing
only a nightgown.”99 Alito recognized that a Terry frisk is only permitted
“when, under the circumstances, an officer has a reasonable belief that the
subject is armed and dangerous.”100 Thus, Alito held that the frisk of the
wife violated the Fourth Amendment because “under Ybarra her presence
on the premises was not alone sufficient to justify the pat down.”101
However, while finding a Fourth Amendment violation, Alito held that
the qualified immunity doctrine barred the Levetos’ section 1983 claim,
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thus denying any relief for this constitutional violation.102 Alito reasoned
that “a reasonable agent could have believed that patting down Mrs. Leveto
. . . was permitted by the Fourth Amendment.”103 Thus, although (1) Mrs.
Leveto was only connected to criminal activity through her husband, (2)
there was no indication that her husband “was armed or that he even owned
any firearms,”104 and (3) Mrs. Leveto was wearing only a nightgown when
she was frisked in her home, Alito held that the law enforcement agents
could have reasonably believed that the frisk was permissible. Alito’s only
justification for this holding was that “some of the lower court cases
decided after Ybarra indicated a willingness to allow a frisk provided the
person had a somewhat stronger link to the premises than Ybarra did to the
bar where he was found.”105 However, Alito does not cite a single case
contravening the well-settled rule that officers need a reasonable suspicion
that Mrs. Leveto was armed and dangerous before conducting a Terry-style
frisk.106 Only in James Bonds’ world, with a femme fatale like Pussy
Galore, would such a conclusion be reasonable.107
Alito’s dissent in Doe v. Groody,108 one of his most controversial
opinions, further illustrates Alito’s quest to limit remedies for Fourth
Amendment violations by giving expansive scope to the qualified immunity
doctrine. In Doe, police officers were accused of illegally strip searching
the plaintiffs, one of whom was a ten-year-old girl at the time of the
search.109 The officers argued that the strip searches were authorized by a
search warrant; however, Judge Chertoff, writing for the majority, noted
that the warrant did not list either plaintiff as persons to be searched.110 The
officers attempted to justify their departure from the warrant by arguing that
the warrant should be read in light of an accompanying affidavit that
requested permission to search “all occupants” of the residence.111 Chertoff
rejected this argument, holding that while “it is perfectly appropriate to
construe a warrant in light of an accompanying affidavit,” the law is clearly
established that “the warrant must expressly incorporate the affidavit . . .
.”112 The majority noted that “[w]ere we to adopt the officers’ approach to
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warrant interpretation, and allow an unincorporated affidavit to expand the
authorization of the warrant, we would come dangerously close to
displacing the critical role of the independent magistrate.”113
Alito, dissenting, would have held that the officers who conducted the
warrantless strip search of the ten-year-old plaintiff were entitled to
qualified immunity. Alito accused the majority of “employ[ing] a technical
and legalistic method of interpretation that is the antithesis of the
‘commonsense and realistic’ approach that is appropriate.”114 Alito
reasoned that because “the face of the warrant [did] not unambiguously
restrict the persons to be searched,” the court should hold “that the warrant
did in fact authorize a search of all persons on the premises . . . .”115 Alito
further reasoned that even if the warrant did not authorize a search of the
girl, “a reasonable officer certainly could have believed that it did,” and,
therefore, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.116
Overall, Justice Alito’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence exhibits some
disturbing trends for those who hold personal privacy as sacrosanct. Cases
such as Stiver and Baker illustrate Justice Alito’s willingness to stretch the
scope of warrants through legal reasoning to justify highly suspect law
enforcement activities. As demonstrated in Hodge and the Zimmerman
dissents, Alito would further weaken the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment by allowing magistrates to defer to law enforcement expertise
in issuing warrants, thereby reducing the role of the judiciary as a
gatekeeper of Fourth Amendment rights. In addition, by broadly construing
the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment and the doctrine of qualified
immunity, Alito will render Fourth Amendment protections largely illusory.
Already, in Bolden and Lee, Alito has expanded the circumstances in which
a third party may consent to a warrantless search. In addition, in Leveto and
Doe, Alito departed from settled jurisprudence in arguing for qualified
immunity for officers who violate clearly established Fourth Amendment
principles. All of these cases indicate that while serving on the Supreme
Court, Justice Alito will endeavor to shift the balance in Fourth Amendment
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jurisprudence in favor of law enforcement goals—a broad societal
interest—while limiting individual liberty, which is an interest of the
minority.

II.

FIFTH AMENDMENT

The Fifth Amendment is also a major component in the right to privacy.
It protects a person from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.”117 This right to be free from self-incrimination
has become so important to the individual’s protection and to the truthseeking function of the court that police now give a warning to suspected
criminal defendants of this right to remain silent.118 The Miranda warning,
of course, alerts a suspected criminal defendant to his right to remain silent
and to the fact that anything he says can be used against him. It also alerts
him to his right to consult with an attorney and to have his attorney present
during questioning.119 Ideally, the warning is designed as a prophylactic to
safeguard the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, but the
right can be waived.120 The warning should prevent police violations of the
suspect’s right to be free from implicating himself in a crime through what
he might be forced to say, because he has just been told that he is free to say
nothing.
Justice Alito has addressed these aspects of the Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent in a handful of cases. These cases reveal that, as a justice, he
will weaken the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination,
he will seek to restrict the prophylactic usefulness of Miranda warnings,
and he will lower the safeguards of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel in
“right to remain silent” cases.
A. Justice Alito Will Weaken the Fifth Amendment Right To Be Free from
Self-Incrimination.
The right to remain silent is a quintessential expression of the privacy
right. To keep private the contents of one’s mind is reflected in the Fifth
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Amendment’s right to be free from self-incrimination.121 The rationale for
honoring this right is to avoid coercion. If a criminal defendant in custody
is coerced into making a “confession,” then unreliable confessions will
inevitably result; it would therefore be forever uncertain whether the
defendant’s will was overborne through the coercion and whether the
defendant was speaking the truth when he “confessed.”122 Thus, the Fifth
Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination, served by the
prophylactic Miranda rule, uses the privacy right to advance the truthseeking process as well as to protect the individual should they be coerced.
After indictment, the right to assistance of counsel attaches and any
incriminating statements made in the absence of counsel are excluded from
evidence;123 the assumption being, of course, that if a defendant confesses
with his or her attorney’s advice, it will not be involuntary or coerced.
Then-Judge Alito eroded the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in
U.S. v. Balter.124 Although the issue was the use of the defendant’s silence
after arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings for impeachment
purposes,125 Alito commented on the length of such exercise of the right to
remain silent.126 In Balter, the police gave the defendant, DeJesus, his
Miranda warnings. At first, DeJesus gave only routine biographical
information but did not comment on his alleged offenses.127 Two days later,
he telephoned the arresting officer and tried to make a deal, using a story
that made himself the driver but not the triggerman for the alleged crime.128
Alito thought that two days of silence by DeJesus could be justified by
DeJesus’ reliance on the belief, engendered by the warnings, that his silence
could not be used against him.129 Even so, Alito concluded that even if the
prosecution was in error when it commented on DeJesus’ post-arrest silence
for the purpose of impeaching a subsequent exculpatory statement in its
case in chief, it was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence
admitted against DeJesus at trial.130
However, in dicta, Alito went further and noted that “[i]t may be that a
defendant’s silence immediately after receiving Miranda warnings is more
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likely to represent the exercise of Miranda rights than is a defendant’s
silence for an extended period after the receipt of warnings.”131 Bear in
mind that the use of a defendant’s silence—at the time of arrest and after
receiving Miranda warnings—violates the Due Process clause when used
for impeachment purposes.132 Thus, by opening the door to allowing
prosecutors to make such comments on silences longer than two days, Alito
is narrowing the scope of the Fifth Amendment right in a way quite
unexpected by the nature of the right itself. According to Alito, the longer
one exercises the right to remain silent, the more likely one is to have that
silence used against him or her. This analysis chisels apart the privacy right
in the Fifth Amendment by making it more costly to exercise the right when
one needs it the most. A defendant exercising this Fifth Amendment right
for an extended period of time before reaching Justice Alito’s court will
need a strong argument, because his or her silence will be held to a higher
standard.133 Such Fifth Amendment dictum illustrates, again, Justice Alito’s
bias in favor of law enforcement institutions over individual privacy
interests.
Alito’s decision in Reardon v. Hendricks134 also illustrates that he
upholds institutional preferences over individual rights. In Reardon, Alito
applied the voluntariness standard of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte135 to an
alcoholic who traded his confession for a bottle of gin.136 The Schneckloth
Court adopted a totality of the circumstances approach to determine
whether the defendant’s confession was the product of interrogation that
had overborne the defendant’s will.137 All Alito could say regarding the
voluntariness of the alcoholic’s confession was that “clearly established law
forecloses us from assigning controlling weight to Reardon’s
alcoholism.”138 Alito did not discuss whether other factors, in combination
with alcoholism, might have justified a contrary holding if the totality of the
circumstances had been examined, rather than the single factor of the
defendant’s alcoholism. This illustrates again that Justice Alito will not
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move the Court toward broader interpretation of individual rights when it
comes to individual rights.
B. Justice Alito Will Seek To Restrict the Prophylactic Usefulness of
Miranda Warnings by Rejecting the Use of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Doctrine .
The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, growing out of the Fourth
Amendment, limits the admissibility of any governmental evidence that has
been gained by an illegal search or seizure, among other things. To have
the evidence admitted, the government must argue that the causal
relationship between the primary illegality and the evidence obtained
thereby is so attenuated as to purge the latter of the taint. As the Supreme
Court began importing the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine into Fifth
Amendment analysis as applied to statements, some defendants argued that
the doctrine should be applied when earlier, unwarned statements tainted
later statements such that the later statements were “fruit of the poisonous
tree” as well and should be excluded from evidence.139 This was known as
the “cat out of the bag” theory.140
In U.S. v. Tyler, then-judge Alito concurred with the majority of a Third
Circuit panel, which voted to expand the type of Miranda violation it will
consider when deciding the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine in the Sixth141 Amendment context.142 In Tyler, a Mirandized
defendant initially refused to make a statement.143 A short time later, he
was taken to a different police station and a police officer engaged him in
discussion.144 Following this reinitiation, less than an hour later the
defendant began to cry, was re-Mirandized, and made an inculpatory
statement. 145 Eleven days later, still in custody, the police repeated
Miranda warnings, Tyler acknowledged them, orally waived his rights, and
made another inculpatory statement.146
The issue between Alito and the majority was the analysis that should be
applied when a prior Miranda violation is alleged to taint a subsequent
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Mirandized statement.147 In this case, police failed to scrupulously honor a
defendant’s right to cut off questioning.148 Both the majority and Alito
agreed that the taint of an unconstitutionally obtained statement may not
always be attenuated by Miranda warnings. However, Alito took it further,
pointing out that “the rule is inapplicable when the initial illegality consists
of a violation of the Miranda prophylactic rule.”149 Apparently, Alito does
not view the officers’ failure to scrupulously honor a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as the primary problem, but recasts the issue as
the officers’ failure to scrupulously honor a Miranda invocation.150 He
reasoned that the violation in Tyler was not a procedural violation, as was at
issue in Elstad,151 in which the officer neglected to give the warning. In
contrast, in Tyler, the officers violated Miranda after the right was
invoked.152 To Alito, this difference does not appear to matter,153 and
makes it appear that he denies privacy rights by strictly adhering to
questionable precedent.
C. Justice Alito Will Likely Lower the Safeguards of the Fifth Amendment
Right to Counsel.
The Fifth Amendment right to counsel is a chief safeguard of the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent and is therefore an important protection
of an individual’s privacy interests. The Miranda rule requires that once an
accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation, police officers must scrupulously honor that right to cut off
questioning.154 Unlike the right to remain silent, once the right to counsel is
invoked, it cannot be waived merely by an accused’s responses to further
police-initiated custodial interrogation, even if the accused has been reMirandized.155 When an accused has expressed his or her desire to deal
with officers only through counsel, they cannot be subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to
them, unless the accused reinitiates communication with the police.156
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Justice Alito’s past decisions imply that he would put the burden on the
defendant to request an attorney for each fresh interrogation, thus
weakening this constitutional safeguard. For example, in Flamer v.
Delaware,157 Flamer and another man, both suspected in a double murder
investigation, blamed each other for the crime.158 The police read Miranda
warnings to Flamer several times during the interrogation and, each time, he
waived his right to an attorney.159 Flamer did not request an attorney until
arraignment.160 After that request, but before actually consulting an
attorney, Flamer confessed.161 Alito, writing for the court, held that merely
requesting an attorney at arraignment was insufficient to constitute a request
for an attorney in connection with future custodial interrogation.162 This
holding departs from the Supreme Court’s holding in Edwards that police
may not reengage the defendant in questioning once the defendant has
requested counsel and until counsel is made available.163 For Alito,
requesting an attorney at an arraignment or bail hearing is not the same as
requesting an attorney in connection with future custodial interrogation.164
Under Flamer, police can simply jail people and play a game of
reinvocation every time they question an accused. This contravenes the
well-established duty to scrupulously observe an accused’s right to
counsel.165

III.

SIXTH AMENDMENT

The Sixth Amendment’s counsel clause provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense.166 Cases such as Wheat v. United States and Powell
v. Alabama established that a defendant who pays for counsel may choose
who that counsel will be.167
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A. Justice Alito Will Make Unworkable Distinctions in the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel.
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, one of the final decisions of the 2005
term, the Court decided that the Sixth Amendment encompasses the right of
a criminal defendant to have the counsel of his choice—not merely the
assistance that such counsel would provide.168 In other words, lawyers are
not fungible, and a defendant’s choice of counsel is so fundamental to the
trial process that any wrongful denial of a defendant’s first choice of
lawyers warrants a per se reversal.169 In the 5-4 decision, with Justice
Scalia writing for a rare majority that included the four liberal members, the
Court reasoned that what the Sixth Amendment provides is not that a trial
be fair,170 but that “a particular guarantee of fairness be provided…that the
accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best.”171 Contrary to
the government’s claim, no showing of prejudice is required; the right is
violated when counsel is erroneously deprived.172 Such right is part of the
“root meaning” of the Sixth Amendment.173 Furthermore, such denial is not
subject to harmless-error analysis, but instead is a structural defect in the
trial itself.174
The facts make this clear. A Missouri federal magistrate judge refused to
allow Gonzalez-Lopez’s first choice of counsel, Attorney Low, to represent
him on drug-trafficking charges.175 Low, a California lawyer who was
awaiting pro hac vice admission in Missouri, had improperly passed notes
to Gonzalez-Lopez’s Missouri lawyer during the evidentiary hearing—a
violation of a local court rule, according the judge, who barred Low from
further proceedings in the case.176 Gonzalez-Lopez then hired a St. Louis
lawyer who subsequently lost his case.177 The Eighth Circuit overturned the
conviction, ruling that the judge’s improper exclusion of Low amounted to
a structural defect that warranted automatic reversal of the conviction.178
Writing for the dissent, Justice Alito would require a criminal defendant
to make at least some showing that the trial court’s erroneous ruling
adversely affected the quality of assistance that the defendant received.179
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That is because what the Sixth Amendment protects is the “Assistance” that
such counsel is able to provide; it is not the lawyer, but the lawyering, that
the Sixth Amendment protects.180 In other words, in Justice Alito’s view,
lawyers are fungible. This distinction between the lawyer and the legal
advice is simply artificial and impractical. Alito seems to think there is this
thing out there called “legal advice,” disembodied from the lawyer giving it.
Although he argues that the text of the Sixth Amendment supports his
interpretation (“Assistance”),181 it is doubtful that the Framers had such a
distinction in mind. The difference between Alito and the majority is that
Scalia focuses on the autonomy of the defendant to choose whomever he or
she will choose, whereas Alito focuses on whether the “Assistance” was
effective—regardless of who provided it—and whether such assistance
prejudiced the defendant. Such disrespect of an individual’s choice is not
surprising when one examines Justice Alito’s other privacy decisions.

IV.

OTHER PRIVACY CASES

One of the most controversial, yet also most important, individual rights
is the liberty interest in privacy. While this right is not expressly conveyed
in the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court identified it and applied it in
Griswold v. Connecticut.182 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
explained as follows:
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right
of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment
is one . . . . The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers “in any house” in time of peace without
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the “right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” The Fifth Amendment in its SelfIncrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.
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The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”183
Thus, privacy is a liberty implied by the express rights guaranteed in the
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. This liberty interest is
protected through the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.184
A. Justice Alito’s Decisions Imply He Will Weaken the Privacy Right
Regarding Women’s Reproductive Rights.
The right of a woman to elect to undergo an abortion is founded on the
right to privacy.185 The Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade,186 stated that there
is a fundamental right to privacy that includes “the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusions into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.”187 This right to privacy, a protected liberty interest, is
“broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision to terminate her
pregnancy.”188 Thus, if the right of a woman to elect an abortion is picked
apart, the Supreme Court’s articulation of the right to privacy is further
eroded as well. Justice Alito’s previous treatment of reproductive rights
serves as a strong indicator that he will favor institutional interests over the
individual liberty interest in privacy.
Justice Alito never wrote the majority opinion in the three reproductiverights cases he heard while on the Third Circuit.189 His concurring
argument in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey190
was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court on review.191 Since then,
however, Alito concurred in Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v.
Farmer,192 in which the Third Circuit, following Casey, affirmed that a state
statute regulating partial-birth abortion is unconstitutional because it
constitutes an undue burden if it lacks an exception for performing an
abortion to preserve the health of the mother.193 Alito concurred only in the
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result; he would have held that the case was entirely controlled by Stenberg
v. Carhart,194 which decided the constitutionality of a similar Nebraska
statute and thus did not require the analysis in which the majority
engaged.195 These opinions further demonstrate Justice Alito’s willingness
to forego individual privacy rights in favor of institutional interests.
B. Justice Alito Will Restrict Reproductive Privacy Rights by Making the
Undue Burden Test More Restrictive, Thus Allowing Coercion of a Woman
into Revealing Private Information in Exchange for an Abortion.
Justice Alito will restrict reproductive privacy rights by taking advantage
of the undue burden test’s inherent flexibility and malleability. Following
Justice O’Connor’s concurring lead in Hodgson v. Minnesota,196 the Third
Circuit in Casey applied the rule that if a statute regulating abortion does
not impose an undue burden, the statute need only meet the rational
relationship test to pass constitutional muster; otherwise, if there is an
undue burden, strict scrutiny applies.197 Under this test, the majority held
that a spousal-notification provision of a state law regulating abortion was
an undue burden on a woman’s abortion decision and did not serve a
compelling state interest.198 Justice Alito disagreed on this point, arguing
that because only a few women suffer from the spousal notification
provision, the provision is not unduly burdensome to women as a whole.199
Thus, Alito would have held that the spousal notification provision did not
impose an undue burden; he would have analyzed the spousal notification
provision under the rational relationship test,200 and he would have held that
the provision serves the legitimate interest in furthering the husband’s
interest in the fetus.201
The analytical path that Justice Alito traced in his Casey concurrence
represents an attack on the privacy right. His reading of Justice O’Connor’s
abortion decisions led him to conclude that “an undue burden may not be
established simply by showing that a law will have a heavy impact on a few
women but that instead a broader inhibiting effect must be shown.”202
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Alito’s approach was opposite to that of the majority, which centered the
undue burden analysis on the degree of restriction an affected woman might
experience, and not on whether the adversely affected group is a small
fraction of the number of women who might seek an abortion.203 Alito’s
reverse balancing in Casey implies that he would find a woman’s right to
privacy outweighed by a husband’s interest in the fetus or a societal interest
in preventing abortions.204
The Supreme Court reviewed Casey and affirmed the Third Circuit
majority’s reasoning.205 The Court held that the proper focus of
constitutional inquiry was the group for whom the law was a restriction, not
the group for whom the law was irrelevant.206 Considering the women for
whom the statute is relevant, the Court held that the spousal notification
provision would be a substantial obstacle to those women’s choices to
undergo abortions.207 Thus, Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion
voiding the spousal-notification provision as being unconstitutional.208 In
doing so, O’Connor protected an individual woman’s interest in privacy.
Alito, on the other hand, had argued to diminish the role that coercion might
have on a woman’s choice to abort, thus ignoring any coercion that
individuals within a protected group might undergo.
As in the Fifth Amendment context, Alito’s opinion in Casey illustrates
that he does not see coercion in this context to be a burden large enough to
trigger a constitutional violation. Justice Alito pointed out in his Casey
concurrence that a woman under a spousal-notification regime can have an
abortion so long as she reveals her private decision to her husband.209
While a father unquestionably has an interest in his unborn offspring,210
O’Connor’s plurality recognized that, in certain circumstances, the cost on
the mother of notifying her spouse might be prohibitive. Such reasoning
implies that the spousal notification requirement might have a coercive
effect on a woman’s right to choose to abort. Essentially, a pregnant
woman who does not want to carry to term would be made to pass a
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gauntlet, where she must offer her privacy right in exchange for passage.
Once again we see the trading in rights that is an Alito favorite.

V.

CONCLUSION

If our civilization is to be judged by its treatment of minorities, we should
be wary of Justice Alito’s confirmation to the Supreme Court.211 The
Constitution protects privacy through the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
on unreasonable searches and seizures and the warrant requirement, the
Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination, and the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ protection of liberty in their due process clauses.
Our analysis of Justice Alito’s Third Circuit opinions indicates that he will
weaken the constitutional protection of privacy for individuals in each of
these areas. Such erosion of privacy rights represents a shift of the Court’s
emphasis from individual protections to institutional concerns.
At the end of a report Alito helped write as a senior at Princeton
University in 1971, he recognized that “[t]he erosion of privacy, unlike war,
economic bad times, or domestic unrest, does not jump to the citizen’s
attention . . . . But by the time privacy is seriously compromised, it is too
late to clamor for reform.”212 Ironically, it may be Justice Alito’s
confirmation onto the Court that finally signals that our right to privacy is
irreversibly compromised.
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